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Managerial discretion is the focal theme bridging the clash between two schools of 
thoughts; whether executives have greater influence on their firms’ outcomes or other 
factors restrain their actions (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987). It is argued that 
constraints come from inertial, normative and environmental forces (e.g. DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983). Of these restraints is the institutional environment in which a firm is 
headquartered. Our paper falls within this research stream and provides an extension 
for Crossland and Hambrick (2007, 2011) work. We investigate the national level of 
discretion in new cross-cultural contexts, provide deeper understanding of its concept, 
and shed the light on undiscovered discretion’s antecedents and consequences. We 
adopt a quantitative approach in which questionnaires represent our data collection 
instrument. We anticipate that in high discretion countries firms tend to follow what 
Miles & Snow (1978) labeled ‘Prospector’ strategy as opposed to low discretion 
countries in which firms incline to implement a ‘Defender’ strategy. 
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1. Introduction 
Do executives matter? Organizational theory, population ecology and 
neoinstitutionalism scholars, on one hand, believe that inertial, normative and 
environmental forces constraint executives’ actions (e.g. Hannan & Freeman, 1977; 
DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). On the other hand, strategic management academics 
assure greater effect of executives on organizational fate and form (e.g. Wiersema & 
Bantel, 1992; Sanders, 2001; Hambrick & Quigley, 2014). Within this divide, 
Hambrick & Finkelstein (1987) introduced managerial discretion as a new theoretical 
concept shifting the debate from ‘whether’ to ‘when’ executives matter. Managerial 
discretion refers to the latitude of strategic actions (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987), in 
other words the leeway executives have to implement strategic initiatives.  Since then, 
a growing body of investigations began to discover its various constructs. The bulk of 
this research stream has focused mainly on: the industrial (e.g. Hambrick & 
Abrahamson, 1995; Carpenter & Golden, 1997; Hambrick et al, 2004; Sahaym et al, 
2012), organizational (Boyd & Salamin, 2001; Kim, 2013) and individual’s (e.g. 
Roth, 1992; McClelland et al, 2010) antecedents. While this greater emphasis on 
micro constructs, the institutional paradigm has been significantly ignored. In this 
consideration, Crossland & Hambrick (2007, 2011) were first to integrate the 
national-level framework with discretion, in which they examined the variance 
degrees of discretion across several OECD countries. Despite this attempt, the 
research on national level of discretion is characterized by a dearth of investigation in 
terms of its antecedents, consequences and validity in other cross-cultural contexts. 
Consequently, does this difference apply to other countries? What is the impact of 
discretion (national-level) on firms’ outcomes, particularly strategic orientation? All 
these questions and others remained unanswered. Accordingly, our research aims to 
enhance, enrich and improve our understanding on discretion by uncovering new 
precursors and consequences. 
2. Literature Review 
Earlier studies have concentrated on discretion’s three core dimensions: managerial 
individualities (e.g. Roth, 1992; Carpenter & Golden, 1997; McClelland et al, 2010), 
internal organization (e.g. Rajagopalan, 1997; Finkelstein & Boyd, 1998; Boyd & 
Salamin, 2001; Quigley & Hambrick, 2012; Kim, 2013) and industry (e.g. Haleblian 
& Finkelstein, 1993; Magnan & St-Onge, 1997; Datta & Rajagopalan, 1998; Peteraf 
& Reed, 2007; Keegan & Kabanoff, 2008; Finkelstein, 2009; Hambrick & Quigley, 
2014). These efforts could be classified into diverse categories:  
First, studies that looked at the antecedents of discretion such as: Hambrick & 
Abrahamson (1995), Carpenter & Golden, (1997), Key, (2002) and Hambrick et al 
(2004). Findings indicated that product differentiability, market growth and demand 
instability as industry features enhance the level of discretion. But, industry legal 
constraints, commoditization and powerful external forces (e.g. supplier power) 
diminish discretion. In terms of organizational factors, it has been shown that resource 
availability and slack intensify discretion. However, organizations’ capital intensity, 
size, age and powerful inside forces (e.g. shareholders) have negative effects. 
Moreover, it was empirically tested that aspirational level, tolerance for ambiguity, 
cognitive complexity, internal locus of control and power base play an important role 
in strengthening the degree of discretion provided to executives (mainly CEOs). 
Whereas, executives’ commitment to the status quo and external locus of control are 
barriers limiting their latitude of actions. 
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Second research category, (e.g. Miller et al, 1982; Singh & Harianto, 1989; 
Abrahamson & Hambrick, 1997; Datta & Rajagopalan, 1998; Finkelstein & Boyd, 
1998; Keegan & Kabanoff, 2008; Finkelstein, 2009; McClelland et al, 2010; Graffin 
et al, 2011; Sahaym et al, 2012; Hambrick & Quigley, 2014) reviewed the 
consequences of discretion. In here, researchers found that higher discretion leads to 
greater: accounting adjustments, CEO effect on performance, CEO compensation, 
CEO compensation alignment with performance, use of golden parachutes, initiative 
strategies (e.g. exports, strategic changes, new market entry) and changes in CEO 
behaviour (innovativeness, risk taking, pro-activeness). In addition to that, discretion 
causes changes in CEO commitment to the status quo, homogeneity within industries 
and changes in financial implications (debt usage, discipline from debt).  
The third category could be labeled as studies employing discretion as an 
intermediary variable (e.g. Lieberson & O’Connor, 1972; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 
1990; Hambrick et al, 1993; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993; Magnan & St. Onge, 
1997; Buchholtz et al, 1999; Datta et al, 2005; Goll et al, 2008; Preston et al, 2008; 
Campbell et al, 2012; Messersmith et al, 2013). In this vein, scholars mediated 
discretion forces (e.g. industry, individual and organizational characteristics) between 
independent (e.g. CEO power, locus of control, firm performance, industry type, 
strategic persistence, strategic conformity, tenure, power, compensation, etc.) and 
dependent variables (e.g. firms’ outcomes including financial performance, strategy 
and CEO behaviour) in order to illustrate the significant effect of discretion. 
Furthermore, some have attempted to go beyond the industry boundaries and 
investigated the influence of the institutional environment (e.g. Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 
1998; Makhija & Stewart, 2002; Crossland & Hambrick, 2007, 2011; Crossland & 
Chen, 2013; Rabl et al, 2014). The seminal work of Crossland & Hambrick (2007, 
2011) tested the effect of national institutions on CEO discretion levels across 15 
countries. They empirically found that informal (individualism, uncertainty tolerance 
and cultural looseness) and formal (ownership structure, legal origin, employer 
flexibility) institutions significantly affect the level of discretion available to CEOs in 
a particular country. More importantly, they argued that discretion varies widely from 
one country to another according to the level of constraints exerted by its institutional 
environment (Crossland & Hambrick, 2007, 2011). That being said, in countries 
where discretion is high, executives’ effect on firms’ outcomes increases (Crossland 
& Hambrick, 2011).  
The latter stream explored the antecedents of discretion on a new scale, the 
institutional environment. However, some additional investigations such as: the 
consequences of discretion at the national level, validity of these findings in a 
different context and other antecedents of discretion are still unexplored.  
3. Gaps Identification & Contribution 
Despite the increased number of work on managerial discretion, significant gaps 
remain present particularly within its institutional paradigm. As such, researchers 
have the opportunity to fill in these holes and this represent our core purpose. 
In essence, higher discretion at the national-level leads to greater CEO effect on 
firm’s performance (Crossland & Hambrick, 2011) and higher CEO dismissal 
sensitivity (Crossland & Chen, 2013). It also indicates that executives have more 
accountability, greater comfort with uncertainty, higher power and a more risk taking 
behaviour (Makhija & Stewart, 2002). These findings represent discretion 
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consequences so far, but some other implications on organizational outcomes remain 
unknown. For instance, Miles and Snow (1978) well-known strategic typology have 
presented several firms’ strategic orientations including: Prospector strategy (firms 
pioneering in product & market development); Defender strategy (companies having 
no or little market & product development); Analyzer strategy (mid-point between the 
previous two); and finally Reactor strategy (firms possessing inconsistent strategies). 
These strategies can be employed by firms in order to efficiently reflect and adapt to 
their environment. Since executives have greater effect on firms’ outcomes 
(Hambrick & Quigley, 2014), then, by taking into consideration the various national 
discretion level, what would be the impact of CEOs on firms strategic orientation. 
None of the previous studies has considered such link; accordingly, our work 
scrutinizes the relationship between national discretion levels and firms’ strategic 
orientation. Our main argument resides in the notion that in high discretion countries 
CEOs possess greater leeway over their strategic choices and actions, and as 
organizations’ competitive strategy tends to be influenced by the level of discretion 
available in the industry (e.g. Rajagopalan & Finkelstein, 1992). Then, we argue that 
CEOs of firms headquartered in high-discretion countries are more likely to follow 
‘Prospector’ strategy as opposed to their counterparts in low-discretion environments, 
which are more suited to excel a ‘Defender’ strategy. Moreover, as ‘Analyzer’ 
strategy is the mid-point between prospector and defender, thus we argue that CEOs 
leading firms located in countries with moderate discretion levels tend to lean more 
toward implementing ‘Analyzer’ strategy. Lastly, we are omitting the use of ‘Reactor’ 
strategy due to its consideration as a strategic failure (e.g. Miles & Snow, 1978; 
Rajagopalan, 1997).  
Moreover, it is worth to note that almost every study that tackled discretion has been 
conducted on developed countries (e.g. US, UK, etc.). But, in our case, we chose to 
look at new institutional environments that have been ignored by other scholars either 
due to accessibility issues or interests. Thus, by looking at Middle Eastern markets 
that are characterized by different informal and formal institutions, we would be able 
to enrich the discretion concept. 
4. Methodology 
Sample 
As previously mentioned, our main focus is to analyze discretion in new cross-
cultural context, the Middle East. Hence, we look at: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
(KSA), Lebanon and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as our main context. Despite 
their belongingness to the Arabian cluster, these nation-states significantly vary in 
terms of their national institutions (e.g. culture, governance, etc.), hence, providing 
fertile ground for assessing the various effect of national institutions on discretion. 
Additionally, even in cross-cultural studies (e.g. Hofstede, 2001, House et al, 2004) 
these countries have been neglected and characterized as being similar in their 
institutional environment as the rest of Arab countries. Therefore, our contexts also 
involve a cross-cultural contribution and contradict the view that Arab countries are 
all the same. 
Discretion Measures 
Instead of measuring discretion proxies, like most of preceding studies did, either 
industry, executive or organization (e.g. Finkelstein & Boyd, 1998; Boyd & Salamin, 
2001; Peteraf & Reed, 2007; Finkelstein, 2009), we adopt a direct measure alike to 
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Crossland & Hambrick (2011). These scholars have estimated discretion degree using 
two expert panels (international fund managers and academics) having extensive 
international experience in terms of professional work or research. Seeking discretion 
scores from external parties is more reliable in this case as we are measuring 
discretion at the macro level, meaning managers are not influenced by the internal 
dynamics of their firm. It is worth to note that some researchers (e.g. Carpenter & 
Golden, 1997) have attempted to directly measure discretion by surveying executives 
about their perception of discretion. But, such approach leads to biased responses as 
executives exaggerate their potency on firms’ outcomes (Hambrick & Abrahamson, 
1995), this would result in assuring a greater degree of discretion, which might not 
necessary be the case. 
Thus, we sought discretion scores from a panel of experts compromised of 
management consultants working in high profile consultancy firms (e.g. McKinsey & 
Company, Strategy&, BCG, etc.). These participants are classified according to 
hierarchical position and the country in which they are based. In other words, we 
obtained discretion scores only from consultants based in UAE, KSA and Lebanon 
and occupying the following positions: principals, partners, senior partners, directors 
or executive directors. These individuals possess extensive knowledge and expertise 
enabling them to provide valid responses. Discretion scores are gathered via online 
questionnaires based on seven-point Likert scale in which we ask participants to rate 
in their perception the degree of discretion provided to CEOs of public firms (publicly 
listed) headquartered in a particular country. 
Institutions & Other Measures 
Besides, we sought informal institutions measures from GLOBE study, a recent and 
more developed cross-cultural model, by House et al (2004). House and colleagues 
(2004) generated scores for 9 informal institutions in 62 societies by surveying 
domestic firms operating in three different industries. However, they did not generate 
any scores for UAE, Lebanon or KSA. Thus, we employ the ‘Beta Survey’ of the 
GLOBE to assess the impact of 7 informal institutions (collectivism, uncertainty 
avoidance, power distance, future orientation, performance orientation, humane 
orientation and assertiveness). Our approach is identical to House et al (2004) but 
with a more stratified sampling. We circulated 135 questionnaires in each country to 
middle managers and employees working for domestic firms that operate in fives 
industries: Banking, Retail (non-food), Real Estate & Construction, Medical 
Appliances and Fast Moving Consumer Goods (FMCG). We chose such sampling to 
lower the effect of organization culture and industry norms. Our main objective is to 
get country scores, thus participants were either nationals of the country we are 
surveying or have been there for more than 10 years. 
Finally, for the other set of variables, the data collection is as follows: 
• For formal institutions, we obtained scores from La Porta et al (1999) and 
other works (e.g. Ali et al, 1991; Guisinger, 2001; Ali, 2009) in order to 
operationalize legal origin and ownership structure. 
• Firm performance and CEO effect are obtained using accounting based and 
market-based measures including: return on asset (ROA), return on invested 
capital (ROIC), return on sales (ROS), market to book value (MTB), etc. (e.g. 
Bertrand & Schoar, 2003; Crossland & Hambrick, 2007, 2011).  
• Firm strategic orientation is assessed using objective measures such as: ratio 
of R&D to sales, MTB, annual sale change (%), marketing to sales ratio, 
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capital intensity and ratio of employees to sales. This is consistent with 
previous studies (e.g. Ittner et al, 1997; Bentley et al, 2013). 
 
5. Conclusion 
The discretion’s institutional framework remains an understudied research domain 
despite some prior endeavors (e.g. Crossland & Hambrick, 2007; 2011). This stream 
of research deserves supplementary investigation particularly in terms of the validity 
of previous findings and in relation to the consequences associated with such 
framework. Our attempt is expected to shed fresh lights in the strategic management 
field by enhancing the understating of discretion, providing the validity of its national 
constructs and exploring some new consequences. 
6. Schedule  
We expect our research to take circa one year for completion subject to a six months 
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